

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 1, Folder 24

August 2, 1945 -
August 15, 1945

Frame: 0763

ComMBRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

August 2, 1945.

Dear Commodore:

I hope that you will forgive my delay in writing to you relative to your courtesy in transporting Captain Bowling and myself from Balikpapan to Tawi-Tawi, but with my change in command status, I have been pretty busy. However, I want you to know that no one could appreciate your thoughtfulness more than we do, as the attention given to us aboard your Flagship was very thorough indeed.

It was particularly interesting to me to be on board an Australian vessel flying the White Ensign on the Third and Fourth of July because, until this war, there seemed to be some feeling that maybe the Fourth of July was not appreciated by our sister power. There seemed to be no such thought on board the Shropshire, and I think, for that matter, that there is not and has not been for years on board any vessels of His Majesty's Navy. The good humour relative to the fact that Australia was to celebrate this day, because it was on that day that the British Empire had become liberated from the United States, was noted with satisfaction. It is apparent that, by being liberated from each other, we have, thereby, become fast friends.

I thought that the quality of beer and whiskey that you provided was a vast improvement over anything that we have in the good, old U.S.A., and merely indicates that "cutting of liquor" is very ruinous indeed. After a couple of days on the Shropshire, I was willing to suggest that a so-called "wet ship" was a good idea after all.

I was sorry to hear that you are soon to be assigned to shore duty, not because I don't want you to go ashore, but because, in my association with you, when you were serving with Admiral Oldendorf, you always turned in a perfectly splendid and extremely gallant performance. The radars on your ships against air were particularly fine, and I suppose, to my dying day, I will hear "Bogey --- Port hole out", which was usually an indication that the enemy suicide planes were near at hand.

With warmest regards to you, and with many appreciations for your courtesy to me, and with regret that our team which cracked the Philippines is gradually being broken up, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

R. W. BATES, Commodore, USN

Commodore Harold Farncomb (CB), RAN,
c/o Royal Australian Navy Headquarters,
Sydney, Australia

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ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

2 August 1945.

Dear Admiral Deyo:

I am in receipt of a letter dated June 27 from you in which you stated that you had had a very happy leave and had succeeded in getting into Washington for a few days, but did not remain there. In this, I think that you were quite wise because, when I got to Washington with Admiral Oldendorf, Admiral King told Admiral Oldendorf that he didn't want him to hang around there but to get on leave as soon as he could. So, Admiral Oldendorf went off to New York and I remained behind a few days to clear up the multitude of questions that were being asked. You should have been of great value to them on the subject of suicide planes and attacks, and I hope that you were able to help them on this subject.

It was very nice of you to speak to the various senior officers about me and to put in a good word for me. A friendly word at the right time often pays off in very big dividends, and I am most appreciative of your thoughtfulness in this matter. I was very glad to have had the privilege of serving with you, although, at first, with my cracked head and sprained shoulder, I wasn't all that you would have desired, I feel quite sure. I thought that, after a little while, when we had got organized and knew one another, the combination was excellent, and I have told many people in the Fleet how well you did. I had plenty to say on this subject around CinCPac, and I know that Admiral Sowell and others told me that they had enjoyed serving with you very much indeed. I want to see you get another big command because you have been in many operations in both oceans and seem to have excelled. You are a Senior Rear-Admiral now, and I should like to see that third star on your collar, where I told you a long time ago it would be, if you were given any job commensurate with your capabilities. CruDivTHIRTEEN is all right. They always keep some older, but highly capable officers, available in the ships, and that is why you are there, although the job, to you, is small. They kept Admiral Giffen and Admiral Oldendorf out here for a long time before they made them Vice-Admirals, and now it is your turn.

I was glad to hear that you had seen the family of your late Communication Officer, Lieutenant Page. For your information, I did not write to them as I had planned to do because, from your description of Lieutenant Page's family set-up, I did not feel it would lend itself to anything from me. Your visit there to the family was, without doubt, of exceptional value, and I hope they now thoroughly understand the disaster which befell their son. Visits of this kind are not pleasant. I know that everyone in the family appreciated the fact that you did it. I had to visit the Chandler

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family, father and wife, to explain to them the loss of their son and husband. I can assure you that it was difficult because they invited me there three times with new members of the family present each time to tell them about it.

Did you make any recommendations for awards for any of your Staff or your Captains or Admirals? In the case of Admiral Oldendorf, when I was Chief of Staff, I generally prepared for him citations for the Flag Officers under his Command; for the Captains in his own Division; for any of the senior destroyer people who were under him, and for members of his Staff who seemed most worthy in the particular occasion. Unfortunately, they broke up the Deyo-Bates combination before I was able to accomplish the above for you, but I hope that it has been done. I think that it is pretty important today because awards are being given away rather freely, now that the war seems to be nearing an end, and I have heard a considerable number of officers in the Fleet complaining of the fact that neither they, their officers nor men have been recognized in over a year. This is not Admiral Oldendorf's fault, but is due to the fact that, although he has recommended his Admirals and Captains, the Admirals and Captains, in turn, have overlooked their own people. For instance, when I was given an award for Command of the Minneapolis, I recommended a number of my officers and men for awards, and, after the battle of Surigao, Admiral Oldendorf arranged with the 7th Fleet that every ship wherein the Captain received an award, would be entitled to submit approximately twenty recommendations, at least half of which were to be given to the enlisted personnel. I think that everyone was quite happy about it.

I notice that you seem to think that my Headquarters are at Pearl. This, of course, is not so, as I am afloat on the U. S. S. Acontius, which is an eleven thousand ton tender. At the present moment, the ship is being converted to make it more suitable as my Flagship, and once the job is completed, I plan to go up into our old hunting grounds where I have already sent some of my Command. My PT boats in the North have already sunk a number of Jap barges and luggers off the northern tip, where the Japanese are endeavouring to escape, and have rescued a considerable number of pilots and have towed in planes which have made forced landings at sea. I understand that General Stillwell is pleased.

I should certainly like to see that movie about the Tennessee, showing how she was hit. That was quite a day. I remember that I was pretty sure that it was going to happen, because, if you will recollect, I did not think the ship was shooting too well, nor was too well trained. After the hit, you turned to me and said, "For God's sake, don't make such forecasts again."

Once again, many thanks for your thoughtfulness in my behalf,
and with deep appreciation to you and with regards to the Staff,
which I still insist is one of the most capable I have ever served
with, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Rear-Admiral Morton L. Deyo, USN,
Commander Cruiser Division THIRTEEN,
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ComMBronaPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

2 August 1945.

My Dear Scruggs:

Thank you very much for your letter of 25 July which was a little discouraging to me, but which I, necessarily, must recognize as the law.

I have just sent through a new request for increase in personnel, which is still considerably less than that requested by 7th Fleet MBrons, but which seems necessary for my Staff. I am endeavoring to keep my Staff small, but the lack of training of the personnel is placing a difficult problem on me.

It is all very well for Officer Detail to make the statement that the people they sent here were the best available. If this is so, the Navy is in very bad shape. Commander Walsh, my Chief Staff Officer, has little knowledge of actual combat conditions in the Pacific, and his knowledge of how to run a staff is not great. It was for that reason that I requested one of three officers, to wit, McKellar, Montgomery, or Westholm. I did not know any of them, but, out here, they were, each and all three, highly recommended, and I was advised, also, that Commander Walsh would not be found particularly suitable in view of his lack of combat experience in the PT boats, but would probably be assigned without any reference to me, whatsoever. This is exactly what happened. I find that my Personnel Officer has had no experience in Personnel, my Gunnery Officer frankly says that his gunnery experience is very limited, and he did not even know what a "danger space" or "a mean point of impact" was. There seems to be considerable doubt as to the capabilities of my Materiel Officer, and so I have requested a relief, which request has temporarily been set aside. I find, further, that my Communication Officer is of doubtful quality as, instead of being a traffic man, he apparently is a materiel man. Why these conditions exist, I do not know.

I have seriously pondered requesting the detachment of at least four or five of my Staff as being entirely unqualified for service on a staff which is running combat operations. But I have decided that, for the present, I shall do my best to train them. I have just completed a course of training for most of the officers on Vice-Admiral Oldendorf's Staff, all of whom had a much greater background for staff work than mine have here, so that I am afraid my responsibilities will be greater here than there in this matter. Fortunately, I think I have, in Swift and Bonte, two capable officers who will be of inestimable help to me, and I have no doubt but that Commander Walsh, who ran the school at Melville

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so well, will, in time, measure up to my requirements. I realize that you have very little interest in the above, but I am telling you about it merely to indicate why my letter to you seemed somewhat irritable.

I know that you have a hell of a job there on these allowances, because I had the difficult job of trying to straighten out Squadron ONE's allowances. I don't know whether you handle the allowances of ships such as the old battleships, but if you do, I hope that you found acceptable what we finally turned in. I did my best to keep the personnel requirements down, and I am doing the same thing here. The reason that it is often difficult, in our modern war Navy, to keep the personnel requirements down, is because there are such a limited number of all around officers that special men are required for special holes, rather than one man filling all holes.

I was glad that you remembered me in the destroyers, and I don't believe that I have changed a bit in my requirements that everybody do their duty as rapidly and efficiently as possible. The performance of the Minneapolis is an indication of what I mean, and I think that the Bombardment and Fire Support Group of the Pacific Fleet, which carried through from Palau to Leyte to Surigao to Lingayen and to Okinawa, was, in a sense, a tribute to that same thought.

Once again, I don't want this letter to be sent anywhere excepting to yourself because I don't want to be considered a grouser at all, and people always misread everything. I merely want to indicate that it seems incredible to me that out of all the officers available in the PT Fleet, as well as in the other fleets, because a PT staff does not necessarily have to consist entirely of PT men, those chosen and assigned to me should be so uninformed. All of the officers who have been assigned are charming gentlemen, and, to be quite honest, I am already fond of them. But wars can not be won by charm, they must be won by efficiency and duty excellently performed.

In my new request for allowances, I have indicated that I desired an aviator. I think that the PTs should have an aviator, although it is something new. In the operations in the North, there will be considerable air, possibly on both sides, and the coordination of air strikes and air cover, etc., can best be done through an air-man on the Staff. Lieutenant Commander Jackson on Vice-Admiral Oldendorf's Staff is succeeding admirably

in this regard. However, our own battleships, particularly the older ones, can be recognized by our own planes, but if the enemy are using a lot of small craft, our planes may not be able to distinguish which are our own small craft, such as PTs, and, therefore, our own pilots must be briefed concerning our own PT movements.

With warmest personal regards, and thanks for your interesting letter on the subject of Personnel, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Captain R. M. Scruggs, USN
Room 2060
Arlington Navy Annex
Arlington, Va.

ComMBRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

3 August 1945.

Dear Admiral Ike:

I haven't heard from you for so long that I am a little disappointed about it, but possibly it is my own fault, so I am writing you to straighten that out. As a matter of fact, I have recently written Orem a letter thanking him for a magazine which he sent me and, at the same time, I told him that I hadn't heard from you. I look for news one of these days.

I have been wondering what you are doing down there in your area, now that you have finished the Caribbean war. I know that, long before the end of the war, you were working hard to roll up your area, and I have no doubt but that, now, your situation is well in hand. I heard, somewhere, also, that you had been allowed to have Mrs. Giffen down there at your Headquarters, which, if true, must have been one of the most gratifying things that ever happened to you in this war. General MacArthur has Mrs. MacArthur wherever he goes, and there is no reason at all why you, with an equivalent responsibility, in an entirely different area, shouldn't have had the same privilege which MacArthur has.

I am glad that I am still out in the Pacific, although I should have felt more than pleased to have been with you in the Caribbean, had Admiral Nimitz permitted me to leave. Orem told me, and I think I told you this before, that they had asked Admiral Nimitz whether I could be released, and he said "No"; which, needless to say, was gratifying because, like you, I always wish combat service. Until you had left this Fleet, no one had had so much service as you, and I have often thought it was too bad that they moved you at the time they did. However, you have many friends, and one reason for moving you out, was, of course, that they all knew that you were not too well and were looking out for your welfare.

I realize that the reason you asked for me to be your Chief of Staff was, primarily, because of loyalty to your own. I realized that you felt that you wanted your own people to be advanced in one way or another, and the thought of the star which you offered me will always move me emotionally. I enjoyed serving with you immensely. I learned a great deal of the practical side of war from you, and I think a good part of my success out here, if I have had any, is based exactly on that. The fact that I haven't yet reached two stars is, in part, I think, due to the fact that I persist in "carrying the torch", as you called it. I would rather go down with the satisfaction of a clear conscience than to sit supine and quiet when vital things are occurring which require attention. As you know, I wrote many articles concerning the conduct of the war in the Pacific, and I did the same on Vice-Admiral

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Oldendorf's Staff, all of which were highly received. But I have been told that they weren't too sure that the ultra Command in Washington liked them, although the working Command in Washington did. All of us are built by the Creator as He wishes, and shaped to His own ends. The leopard can not change its spots, and neither can I, nor do I plan to. I have only had one motto in this war, which has been "victory at minimum cost in minimum time". And it is on that basis that I have endeavored to function.

When I came out here I asked both Admiral Pye and Admiral Kalbfus whether they thought it best for me to remain quiet, even though I saw things which my studies at the War College and elsewhere indicated were wrong. They told me "No" - both of them - and said that it was fundamental, and expected of me, that I should point out, if I could, errors in strategy or policy. This I shall continue to do.

My new job is highly interesting, but I haven't many of my forces yet in combat. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which is Logistics. The PT boat, as you know, in the North Pacific is a relatively unknown quantity, and was not designed for those waters, but it is my hope that the vessels there will do well, despite the adverse nature of the weather. We shall see. The personnel are very game, possess the combat spirit to a high degree, and are worthy of the best the Navy can offer. I hope that they will not be disappointed as the war in the North advances. I shall do my best to make it possible for them to do theirs.

With best regards to the Chief of the Alley Cats, I am as ever,

RAFE ALLEY CAT

Vice-Admiral Robert Giffen, USN
Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, N. Y.

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

3 August 1945.

Dear Orem:

I want to thank you very much for the article from the United States News which you sent me, which contained extracts from the more important speeches by our new President. I don't know what led you to think of me in this matter, but I can assure you that I was extremely pleased and grateful.

So far as I can see, President Roosevelt did not make a mistake when he chose Mr. Truman as his Vice-President rather than Mr. Wallace. I understand that he did this not because he felt that he was on the road toward death, but rather because he thought, for political reasons, Mr. Truman was the better man, the temper of the country being what it was. I was talking to some one who knew about this, the other day, and he said that, although the late President had been thin - in fact, too thin - he was not really sick, and that no one on Earth - no doctor, whatsoever - could possibly forecast a cerebral hemorrhage, unless, of course, there was exceptionally high blood pressure.

I note that changes are gradually being effected around the Navy Department, so I presume that Mr. Truman is changing the situation there as he has done in his cabinet. In some ways I hope that this is not so because, with the war so near an end, it would appear wise to keep the personnel relatively intact. However, the other side of the picture is that it is often wise to put new brooms in some places. Admiral King has done such a tremendous job, and has been so enormously successful that I can't imagine his ever being changed until this war is over.

I hope that you will remember me kindly to anybody there whom I might know, and tell them that, from where we sit, the war seems to be going very favorably indeed, although I, for one, have no illusion. I think that the Japanese will fight on the ground very hard, and I do not look for their surrender until they have been licked in the field. I do not believe that the Japanese Army has been pushed around enough to force them to fight without, at least, taking a chance of proving to themselves that they are really fully outclassed.

I have never heard from our old friend Admiral Giffen since I wrote him to tell him that I appreciated his kindness in offering me the job as Chief of Staff, but that Admiral Nimitz had said that I was to remain in the Pacific and not go elsewhere. I am a great admirer of Admiral Giffen, as you well know, and if anybody did his job in this war, it was he. So, I shall be a little disappointed

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if I don't hear from him one of these days, as I never want to get him unfriendly to me. I have known him too long for that.

With best regards and many thanks again for your kindness, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Captain Howard J. Orem, USN,
Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief,
Navy Department,
Washington, 25, D.C.

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ComMBRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

3 August 1945.

Dear Admiral:

It has been some little time since I have written to you, but I want you to know I certainly haven't forgotten you. The more I function in the Navy, the more I realize how right you were in all of your efforts to raise the mental average of the Navy along the lines of war. The mental process which you helped develop, and which is in use by many of our officers in command, I think has had a lot to do with our success in this war.

In my new assignment as Commander Motor Torpedo Boats, Pacific, I am now receiving officers for my Staff who are supposedly trained in the subject which they represent, such as Gunnery. To my great astonishment, I have discovered that practically none of them have any but the most meager qualifications, and that I shall have to start from the bottom in endeavoring to train each one to use his brain in the solution of his own military problems. Many of them have found that out already, and I know that they are, each and all, convinced that what I say is correct. Likewise, when I was Chief of Staff for Vice-Admiral Oldendorf, I discovered, with the arrival of our new Staff, which was supposed to be composed of most eminent officers, that most of them, just like the PT Staff, were almost incapable of functioning adequately. My Assistant Chief of Staff knew nothing about tactics or other functions of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations; my Logistics Officer knew practically nothing about Logistics, and other officers fitted the picture equally poorly. The Gunnery Officer, who came from the New Jersey, was probably the most incompetent of the lot, although he came there with a high reputation. He talked a lot about what he knew, but it did not require more than a few minutes for me to realize that his knowledge was entirely superficial and that anything he wrote was general, rather than specific, with relation to the immediate problem. He never solved a military problem in endeavoring to accomplish his work, with the result that Admiral Deyo thought nothing of him and, I think, Admiral Oldendorf may think as little. However, I worked on him for three months; I rejected everything he wrote, often many times; and I got him to the point where he used to come around to me to ask what in hell was the matter with him that he seemed to please no one. I told him plainly that he had never learned to be a thinker; that he was evidently a good doer, such as handling his guns, but that a member of a Staff must be an over-all thinker, as well as a competent doer, in his chosen field.

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My work in the PTs has not been too difficult yet because the Pacific Fleet PTs are only now organizing. My Staff has not yet arrived in the major part, but is gradually appearing. The PT is an unknown quantity in the Pacific, except for an unsuccessful operation in the Aleutian area, and there is considerable doubt in the minds of many as to whether they will succeed as well in the North as they have in the Southwest and South Pacific areas. I am open minded in the matter, but I am fearful that by the time we arrive within suitable PT range, the enemy market will have been seriously reduced by air. However, in this matter, I have no feeling because I believe that whoever sinks the Jap has done well, be it plane or ship or under-sea boat. Strategically, I can see some very excellent uses for my Command in rather long strikes, but, so far, I have not succeeded in achieving any such action because the facilities are not available in the areas. The Logistics situation in the Pacific is always slow, and the PT boats must take their turn.

I hope this letter finds you and Mrs. Kalbfus in a very happy frame of mind and enjoying your duty as thoroughly as ever. I don't know whether, under the ruling of the DuBose Board, you are expected to return to the retired list around the first of the year, and, if so, I am thoroughly opposed to it. There are certain officers whose mental power is of such enormous value that they should ever be retained where that power may be kept refreshed and available. Your training and study of war is greater than practically any officer in the Navy, as has been evidenced by the fact that you were twice President of the Naval War College. Your appointment as Historian of the Navy, likewise, is an indication of this mental ability. I don't believe that the Navy will let you go.

I understand that Admiral Oldendorf is functioning in the North, but I haven't seen him since I left him, although I write to him on occasion. He is a fine gentleman, and I have always thought that the combination Oldendorf-Bates was pretty successful in cracking the Japanese power in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, last February, Admiral Nimitz told me so. Such a tribute from such an able Admiral is more than I deserved, but I think that I can be forgiven if I take a little pride in it.

The weather is quite warm where I am, but I presume it is likewise so in Washington. I saw the Assistant Secretary some time ago, and I should have asked him about Washington but I didn't. Strange to say, he is an old friend of mine, and I had entertained him on my ship - the Long - years ago. The minute he saw me he came running over and couldn't have been nicer or more friendly. A man who is a simple soul like that, and extremely

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modest, must be an excellent man for his assignment. There seems to be no doubt but that he is extremely able.

With best regards to you and to any members of the General Board who might be interested in me, I am as ever,

Your old disciple,

R. W. BATES.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN, (Ret.),
General Board,
Navy Department,
Washington, 25, D. C.

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

5 August 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander Walsh.

1. On the trip that you are going to take, I should like you to, among other things which we have discussed, look up as follows:

(a) At Guam:

- (1) Present draft of letter to Commodore Carter concerning transference of ships between fleets.
- (2) Ask Commodore Carter about contemplated strikes against China or even Japan.
- (3) Point out the difficulties incident to obtaining material for Acontius, and the fact that it seems wise to leave as scheduled, even without the equipment which we should receive 1 September at Okinawa, unless something radically different occurs.

(b) At Okinawa:

- (1) See Admiral Price - ask him:
 - (A) How many PTs will be required for air-sea rescue by:
 - (1) Navy (Marines)
 - (2) Army
- (2) See Admiral Cobb (99.5) as to how many PTs are to be required for:
 - (A) Flycatcher Operations.
 - (B) Local strikes.

NOTE: The idea behind this is to ascertain how many PTs will be required at Okinawa, itself, to say nothing of those which may be moved in a forward movement.

(3) See Admiral Price (Commodore Fred Kirtland):

- (A) What is progress on Shana Wan?
- (B) Has Admiral Cotter been consulted regarding plans?

NOTE: PRIVATELY, we want:

- (a) Officer's Club
- (b) Men's Recreation Center
- (c) RP Office
- (d) Hydrographic Office
- (e) Personnel Office
- (f) Sick Bay
- (g) Quarters for personnel on base and for transients, as this may be a distributing center.
- (h) Quarters for Senior Officers
- (i) Mess Hall.

2. ADVISE. Don't PRESS this.

R. W. BATES.

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ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

6 August 1945.

Dear Jake:

I hope that when you receive this that you will still be on the Staff of Admiral Oldendorf, because it was my understanding that he planned to retain you and to disregard that recommendation of Admiral Deyo's. This, I thought, was a good move, and told Admiral Oldendorf so. What you required, when you were there with me, was an opportunity to demonstrate your ability and to learn what it was all about. Staff members can not be made in a day. Now that the whole matter is, I trust, finally cleared up to your satisfaction, I hope that Admiral Deyo did not write something about you which would be adverse. I have been told that he wrote very nice letters about his various Admirals, but I have, personally, seen nothing concerning anyone, not even about myself. So, what he did for me in this regard, I do not know.

When I was at Guam about a month and a half ago, they told me that they had received a letter from Admiral Oldendorf concerning education in the Fleet (Post War), and they said that it did not sound like Admiral Oldendorf, and did I know anything about it. So I told them how Admiral Deyo had started this thing, how you and I had written up the directives and discussed the whole problem, and how it had been finally completed by the Staff, and I thought, mostly, by you. They were quite interested in this whole process, because they agreed with it at CinCPac, and thought that it was a fine letter. I should have written and told you about this before because I knew that you were interested, and it shows that, if a job is tackled in a sensible manner, very often a logical and worthwhile result can be achieved. Our method of handling that problem, by making it a Staff paper and calling upon the different members of the Staff to produce their thoughts in the matter, seems to have born effective fruit.

I have seen Admiral Smith and we have talked over the grounding of that DE that you and I worked so hard over, and he says that he has received no more information on the subject than he had when he wrote his letter on it. So, my presumption on this case is that it has been dropped by Admiral Turner. I think that our final paper on where the blame should lie, and what should be done about it, was correct, and our analysis was so clear - I really think it was clear - that they decided that it was one of the hazards of war. If you have any further info on this thing, I would be interested in hearing about it.

I wrote Lieutenant Duffy, Flag Secretary, the other day, and told him that I would like him to get me the comments which I wrote for Admiral Deyo on Okinawa, and which he rewrote and put in for himself in a sort of a different manner. It is his privilege, naturally, to do that, and I am not offering this comment in a critical sense. But upon my arrival in Guam, Captain Hill said that they were very anxious to get my comments on Okinawa and they hadn't seen any. I told him about Admiral Deyo apparently not wanting to forward them, and he has asked that I give them to him somehow. They are making some tests somewhere, presumably in the Atlantic, and Hill says they are very

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dispositions.
anxious to get some information on formations. They think that what I wrote is along the line of their thought. I wouldn't mention this to you, but Cassidy, who is Flag Lieutenant for Admiral McCormick, told me that it was possible that Duffy is missing - that is, he has been detached. If he has been detached, I should appreciate it if you would produce these essays out of the office and send them to me so that I may send them to Guam.

In addition, I should appreciate your kindness if you will send me that rewrite on Communication Instructions which I was working on about the time I was detached. I did not like the one that we had worked out under Admiral Deyo, or even on the California, and I had all hands working on a new one which, I have no doubt, has been revised since then to suit Admiral Oldendorf. My set-up on my own Flagship for Communications is damned poor, and I would rather have something which has stood the test of time on a large and important Staff, than to fiddle around and make another one myself.

There isn't anything new to talk about. I hear that you are all quite busy up there and that you have been given a large command, which I hope you are able to use effectively. There are a considerable number of PTs in your area now, and it strikes me that they might be used to continue some of these strikes throughout the night which have been only fifty percent completed in the day time. I am sorry, in many ways, that I am not there to figure on these operations because I can visualize a lot of them right now that I think I could work out successfully and show Admiral Oldendorf that they were not only suitable, feasible, and acceptable, but highly desirable. I don't want to see Admiral Halsey get all of the glory, although he is certainly doing a marvelous job, but I want to see Admiral Oldendorf profit from his own experience over these many years. Admiral Oldendorf is entitled to a decent newsbreak for his Force, and if they are going to persist in operating him in the area where I understand he is operating, he should get that break.

With best regards to you and with hopes that your situation is, as I said in the beginning, fully clarified, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Captain Jacob Cooper, USN
Staff, ComBatRonONE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear Admiral Kinkaid:

This is merely a note to thank you for your kindness in inviting me to the buffet supper which you held at your house the other night, and which I thoroughly enjoyed, but which, I am sorry to say, I failed to acknowledge when I was talking to you yesterday. It was nice to get together with so many of my old friends, and I know that all the old friends were glad to meet one another. If I may say so, I think that such suppers are very helpful in assisting the understanding of one another; which is, of course, particularly important among flag officers.

May I say to you again what I said yesterday, that the Japanese power was finally broken by the great battles of the Philippines, of which you were the directing genius of the Naval Command. As I have lectured on war a great deal at the War College, and have studied Command, also, for many years, I can assure you that, if a subordinate may say so, I observed you as closely as I could during those times when Admiral Oldendorf and I were present for planning. Needless to say, I was extremely gratified and proud that our Commander was able to take the whole affair, with its attendant heavy responsibility, "in his stride". It had a strong effect, I think, on all other commanders.

With warmest personal regards and many thanks for your kindness to me during my stay at your Headquarters, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. BATES

Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN,
Commander 7th Fleet,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

0782

ComTBRonPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear Penn:

I should hold myself forever ungrateful if I did not write to you to thank you for the many things which you did to keep me happy and informed during my stay at your Headquarters. No one could have been finer or more thoughtful than you were, and I shall not forget it.

It looks to me as if you have a very fine organization there, and I feel confident that, under your wise handling, it will grow in capability and understanding. In the old days when we used to go to the 7th Fleet, there was always a feeling that we didn't belong. Why this was so, no one knows. But that it was so, everyone knows. In my stay there this time I noted none of that strange aloof atmosphere, and I attribute a large part of this change to yourself.

I could not have been more pleased, as I told you, when I discovered that you had been advanced to Commodore and made Assistant Chief of Staff of the whole 7th Fleet. It was well deserved and was done, no doubt, as Admiral Coombs said, for mutual advantage.

I wish to thank you for your loyalty to me and for your advice, which I hope will bear fruit. Once again, many many thanks for your kindness and help.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Commodore Penn Carroll, USN
Staff
COMMANDER SEVENTH Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0783

ComMBRonPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear "Admiral Ping":-


I thoroughly enjoyed the friendly interest that you and your Staff displayed in me and in my Command, and I was particularly interested and gratified at your desire to avail yourself of my ships in future operations.

As I have served with you, indirectly, in several most vital operations, such as Leyte and Lingayen, and as I served with you, directly, as Chief of Staff for Admiral Oldendorf at Palau, I feel that we have a definite understanding of one another. I know, and we made it official in the Action Reports, that you and your Command functioned marvelously, and that one reason for our great success in the Philippines, which broke the Japanese' will to fight, was the excellence of your leadership and the capabilities of your Command.

I am quite confident that ComPhibForTHREE and his Command will be extremely well thought of after the war, and that history will record, with loud huzzahs, their many successes.

Please remember me most kindly to Pease, and, as for yourself, you know exactly how I feel about you.

Very sincerely yours,



R. W. BATES
Commodore, USN

Vice-Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN,
Commander Amphibious Force THREE,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

0784

ComBTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear Admiral Turner:

This is merely a note to thank you very much for the interest that you and your Staff displayed in me and in my Motor Torpedo Boats. I also desire to express my appreciation of your interest in my humble effort now known as the "Prayer of the Amphibious Forces," and I appreciate your deep understanding of it and its evident place in your command.

I want to repeat here what I endeavored to say to you in the few moments that I was with you yesterday; that all of us who have served with you are extremely cognizant of your exceptional ability, especially in amphibious warfare, and I know that all of us realize that our great amphibious successes in the Central Pacific and, to a degree, in the Southwest Pacific, are a direct result of the thorough training which you gave to everyone who came under your two, three, and four starred flags. I have no doubt but that your position in history is secure.

I sincerely hope that the war is over, but should it not be over, I hope that I shall have something to sell you, and thereby please all of your subordinate commands.

With warmest personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

RWB

R. W. BATES

Vice-Admiral R. K. Turner, USN,
Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California

0785

ComMIBRonaPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear Earl:

I don't like to bother you with any adverse comments about anything but, as you probably know, I have taken over the assignment of Commander Motor Torpedo Boats, Pacific. I haven't been in the job very long, but I have already discovered that the principal weapon of the boats does not perform adequately. I refer to the Packard engines, which are far from satisfactory, so far as I can see. I have ridden in a considerable number of PT boats out here in both PacFleet and 7thFleet, and I have never found a boat which performed in what I would call the correct manner. Something invariably goes wrong. If the boats make slow speed, they announce that the reason for this is that, running at low speed, they have built up carbon, which takes some time to burn out, or requires a complete change of spark plugs. If their boats are hoisted on a carrier, such as an LST or a tanker, they invariably say that the boats were making 2400 RPM when they put them on board, but now they only make 1800 since they have been lowered into the water. Those boats which have not been so treated, and which only make 1800 RPM, attribute their difficulty to excess gasoline or excess load of some kind. They never attribute the difficulty to what I consider are the two probable answers to this failure. One is, that the Packard engine is too sensitive. That is, it seems to readily fall out of adjustment, and it requires too much technical attention to keep it operating satisfactorily. The second fault is corollary to the first; that is, that there are insufficient personnel available to maintain the boats at their highest condition. I have noted, when I have opened the throttle wide and have then put the wheel hard over, that, on a considerable number of occasions, one of the engines has stalled. I can not say, therefore, that I am impressed.

I have been told by many PT officers that they had a rule in the Solomons that boats had to make 2000 RPM before they would be allowed to go into combat, but that, very often, very few boats could make this speed. Whether this is true or not, I do not know, but, from what I have seen of the boats, I should not doubt but that there is some truth in it.

We realize here that the only real defenses of the PT boats are speed and maneuverability. The guns are of secondary value. We are now, and have been for some time, fighting a war against suicide planes. These planes are a very serious nuisance, and nearly approach a menace. I do not think, therefore, that it is wise to permit the PT boats to operate so poorly. For that reason, I have already instituted measures to improve this condition. I do not think that my measures will be successful because I think that the engines that we are accepting are a little bit too much for the personnel to handle. The test of everything in engineering is its performance in service. I do not think, from what I have seen and heard, that the performance of the Packard engine in service is adequate.

(1)

0786

I sent a dispatch yesterday asking for a Packard man to come out here, but even this may not mean much because we received some Packard engines the other day - that is, engines which had been overhauled by Packard, and four of them failed very quickly and had to be removed. The delays incurred under these conditions are not considered satisfactory in war, and especially so had they occurred in a combat area where the services of all boats were necessary. I, therefore, hope that if you send me a Packard man, you will send me the best there is and not somebody who is doubtful or who has not met thorough approval in these areas if he has been here. Perhaps you have, or your department has, some suggestions to offer concerning the best way of maintaining these boats at a maximum speed of about 2500 RPM.


I hope that you are enjoying your work and that your reports of performance in the field are far above what I am saying here. You have a very difficult assignment, to say nothing of a responsible one, and I don't envy you it one bit. I should much prefer to be out here where the bombs may fall on occasions than back there where the bombs also fall, but, as you well know, your bombs are of an entirely different type.

I have seen H. T. Smith on a few occasions and he is swell. He is one of the finest gentlemen I have ever been associated with, and I think the Bureau made a wonderful choice when they sent him out into this area. Wesley Hague is also doing a wonderful job, and I think the Bureau of Ships can take equal pride in his choice.

Do you want me to submit all this about the engines officially? I am reaching the point where, if I don't get better luck pretty soon, I am going to write officially about it.

With best regards, as always,

Your old friend,



R. W. BATES.

Rear-Admiral Earl Mills, USN,
Bureau of Ships,
Navy Department,
Washington, 25, D.C.

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

13 August 1945.

Dear Moosbrugger:

This is merely a note to thank you for your kindness in asking me to luncheon on your flagship, and to, at the same time, express to you my appreciation of the support which you are giving my Command by your recognition of the capabilities of the PT boats and your request for the use of them. Very frankly, I am not one of those who believe in using weapons which are not suitable, nor am I one of those who believe in endeavoring to force higher commands to use weapons which I know may not be the best available. However, I do feel that, for the matters mentioned, our Motor Torpedo Boats can well and amply function, and I look for your continued interest in them.

It was nice to have lunch on board your ship, and it was nice to see my old friend Deutermann, whom I helped to bring up in the days of his nonage. With best regards to you, I am as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Commodore Frederick Moosbrugger, USN,
c/o ComPhibPacFleet,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California

0788

ComBTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

14 August 1945.

Dear Chick:

It was awfully nice seeing you the other day, not only on board your ship, but also at your home ashore, and I was very happy to see that everything seems to be going quite smoothly within your command. I was also pleased to note that your Chief of Staff, my good friend John Vetter, looks well and happy, and that your able Materiel Officer seems to have recovered adequately from his operation.

No one in the Navy, excepting those most intimately connected with it, realizes the enormous importance of Logistics on Operations, and the extraordinary limitations which Logistics imposes upon any prospective plans. You, who are functioning so ably in your area, probably often wondered at this extreme lack of knowledge and appreciation of the weapon of Logistics. However, it is the fault of the Navy because the Navy has never given any attention whatsoever to this matter.

I remember that I was a member of the Shore Station Development Board in Washington, and the question arose as to the necessity for building a supply base at Oakland, California. I, for one, naturally favored it fully, but the great opponent of it was the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations, one Captain L. M. Austin, who got up at the meeting and said that there was no need for this supply base as it was simply designed to obtain a new position for a senior supply officer and, thus, would permit them to request an additional Admiral in that Corps. Such a mental attitude was not helpful in preparing the Navy for war and, after this war, will not be helpful in maintaining the Navy in competent battle readiness.

It was nice of you to invite me to your house for supper and then to that party. Needless to say, I enjoyed it thoroughly. I think that you were wise to get a place ashore as it reduces the mental strain not only upon yourself, but upon your Staff and the ship which wears your flag. It is a good thing for the "Old Man" to get out of the way every now and then.

I want to thank you very much for your advice concerning Logistic matters, and I know that what you told me was quite sound and, as the opportunity offers, I plan to avail myself of your suggestions.

(1)

0789

This blasted war still seems to be on, and I refuse to consider it off unless President Truman says so. Up there in your area, the boys flew off, as you know, and celebrated for two nights something which had not yet occurred, and kept me awake most of the two nights. I was incensed at them but, at the same time, I suppose that it was to be expected, as some of the information sent out seems to have been more optimistic than was rightfully expected. I noted last night that an investigation was under way to find whence came some of the false information.

If you will remember the last war, you will remember that the A.P., through Mr. Roy Howard, announced that the war was over, and this seemed to have created quite a furor at the time. It appears as though we had a mild manifestation everywhere of the same mistake this time.

Many thanks for everything that you have done for me, and rest assured that I appreciate your friendship most deeply, and would like nothing ever to impair it. As ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES
Commodore, USN

Rear-Admiral R. O. Glover, USN
Commander Service Force, 7th Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ComMTRonsPacFleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

15 August 1945

Dear Admiral Nimitz:

I have just heard the announcement that the war is finally over, so I am taking this opportunity to congratulate you upon the termination of your most remarkable campaign across the Pacific. I know that history will record you in most brilliant hue, and there is no doubt but that you deserve anything favorable that may be said about you.

You will, no doubt, receive many "Kudos" from the heads of the Allied Nations and from commanding generals and admirals throughout the world, but, in the end, I feel confident that nothing that any of them might say would be worth to you what your subordinates believe of you. As one of those subordinates who has had the good fortune to have served through the past two years and more of this war under your command, I feel somewhat qualified to express to you the opinion of the fighting man. There can be no doubt but that each and every one of the officers and men who have faced the enemy under your guidance has the most profound regard for your wise judgment and for your humanity. Each and every one of them felt, as he went into battle, that everything had been carefully worked out and thoroughly planned so that his chance of success was great, and his chance of returning to fight again nearly guaranteed. I think that the greatest tribute of all is the thought that each one expressed repeatedly when he said - not that he was a member of the Pacific Fleet - but that he was serving under Nimitz. To be one of Nimitz' men was his pride and satisfaction, his shield and his buckler, his faith and his hope.

So I, who have been honored by you as one of your type commanders, should feel that I was forever ungrateful if I did not, at this moment, express to you the pride that I have felt to have served under you in this greatest of all wars, and to bid you God speed and happiness in all future operations which you may undertake in peace.

With warmest personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R.W.B.

R. W. BATES

Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz, USN
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0791